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I. Introduction
Recent years have seen a resurrection of development banks worldwide. Their disbursements 
increased faster than those of private institutions. New national, regional and multilateral devel-
opment banks were set up. FinDev in Canada (2017), Société de Financement Local in France 
(2013), PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur in Indonesia (2008) and Development Bank of Nigeria 
(2013) are examples of new national development banks. Some others substantially increased 
their capital. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a multilateral development bank with 
a mission to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia commenced its operations in Janu-
ary 2016. The New Development Bank was established in 2014 to support infrastructure and 
sustainable development efforts in BRICS and other emerging economies. Policy-makers and 
academics  reassess the evaluation of these institutions. This new wave is a reaction to the more 
pronounced failures of capital markets following the global financial crisis. Governments recog-
nized that lending by state-owned banks was countercyclical, it helps to mitigate adverse effects 
of the crisis and plays a bridging role between savings and financing needs.
For a number of years now there has been intensified discussion of the need to establish a 
national development or long term credit bank in India. This move would open a new chapter in 
the eventful history of Indian development banks. There were times when they were considered 
essential in India’s catching up with more advanced economies. There were other times when it 
was believed that private sector actors could successfully take over functions from development 
institutions. This paper attempts to put the changes in appraisal in context and take a stand in the 
discussion on the establishment of a new long term finance institution in India. The second part 
of the paper gives a brief summary of the economic argument for development finance institu-
tions in general. The third part deals with the hopeful start of these institutions following India's 
independence. The fourth part discusses the demise caused by the  financial reforms of the 90s. 
The fifth part is devoted to conclusions, lessons and recommendations. 
II. The case for development finance
The economic logic for development finance policies is simple. Capital markets do not allo-
cate resources to areas which are believed to be too risky and/or their payback time is believed to 
be too long. Reluctance of market-based financing affect two segments of business undertakings 
1 This paper is based on a research conducted at Gokhale Institute, Pune, India in Spring 2018. I am thank-
ful to Professor Rajas Parchure who made my stay possible and to Kuljeetsinh Nimbalkar who helped me 
with the collection and processing of the relevant data.
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in particular: those in need of long term financing and  the newcomers. The long time horizon 
and the long gestation lag may expose banks to an accrued risk they are often not prepared to 
take. The problem is often compounded by the mismatches in liquidity and maturity. The avail-
ability of long term sources represents a constraint to long term lending. As a result of scarcity 
of long term finance, investments in infrastructure and other specific capital intensive industries 
lack funding. New companies as well as small and medium scale enterprises in general find it 
exceedingly difficult to obtain bank financing because of the lack of past record and the foresee-
able losses of their early learning period. Even in the advanced capital markets, availability of 
capital is a function of location, industry and presence of banks in the area. An undertaking in a 
remote village without bank branches has a very limited chance to have access to capital.  (Seid-
man2005)) These problems have particular importance in emerging countries with a low density 
of bank branches. 
From a theoretical perspective, development finance policies can stem from market imper-
fections, more particularly from asymmetric information. Companies have superior (more, bet-
ter, earlier) information about their future prospects than creditors or investors. Lenders are 
more unsure whether the borrower has the capacity and / or willingness to pay back its debt. 
If the company has better information about its investment returns than its potential investors, 
external finance may be expensive, a lender will charge a premium to compensate for the dispar-
ity in information or will not lend at all. (Greenwald B. – Levinson A. – Stiglitz J. (1993)  In such 
a situation, some companies would not be able to obtain any credit even though they would be 
willing to repay the lender. They could earn profits if they were given access to credit. Financial 
institutions do not channel funds to profitable opportunities. (Stiglitz (1989) Credit rationing 
is a result of imperfection in capital markets or, in other words, financial market imperfections 
imply credit underprovision and lead to a suboptimal allocation of capital and other resources. 
(Esteva M. – Freixas X.(2018))
Governments can fill the vacuum left by market forces, and provide  capital via development 
finance institutions (DFIs) especially to undertakings that might otherwise have difficulty at-
tracting financing. Even if capital markets were perfect, their capital allocation would be limited 
by the size of domestic savings. In emerging economies this constraint – due to the lack of do-
mestic saving and the lack of domestic capital – is more severe. DFIs  can mitigate this constraint 
by intermediating various non market funds towards domestic firms. By doing so, they can ex-
pand the overall capital supply. These institutions do not measure their performance against 
profit objectives only. Their lending policy includes the pursuit of a social benefit objective, as 
well. This duality raises new and old questions. Do governments have additional information 
on companies' prospects that markets do not have? Is the problem of asymmetric information 
terminated? What is the optimal trade-off between pure profit-making and social impact? Can 
we expect the financing granted for non-remunerative projects markets rightly rejected? Is there 
a risk of subordination of lending policy to short term political interests? Hopefully, this paper 
will answer at least some of these questions. 
III. The rise of development finance in India
The rationale for development finance in India was much the same as it was in other emerging 
economies: the aspiration to catch up through industrialization. Nayyar (2017) provides a good 
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summary of background and performance of development finance institutions.3 He points out 
that the accumulation of own capital was not sufficient , while there was almost no debt or equity 
market for long-term finance in the post-independence times. As a response to market insufficien-
cies, the Nehru government started the establishment  of nationwide institutions.  In parallel, state 
level institutions such as State Financial Corporations (SFC) and State Industrial Development 
Corporations (SIDC), with state governments being the sole owners, were also established. The 
Indian economy is traditionally a bank-based system. Because of scarcity of investable capital and 
the weaknesses of institutions in floating new issues, the government was right to focus on banking 
finance instead of institutions of redistribution of (hardly) existing capital. Nevertheless, emerging 
investment institutions such as insurance companies facilitated issuance of long-term loans by sub-
scribing to bonds of DFIs. Their long term sources helped to match sources and long term assets. 
This wave was followed  by the creation of many refinancing and sector-specific or special-
ized institutions in the 80s. The mushrooming of DFIs is reflected in their business activity. 
Nominal annual growth of their disbursements was especially spectacular in the post 1970s. 
Their share in total bank lending or in gross fixed capital investments showed a dynamic rising 
trend until the turn of the century. (see Fig. 1). In 2000, DFI disbursements reached 30% of lend-
ing to industry, and constituted around 15% of gross fixed capital formation. These numbers are 
also results of the absence of competition in India’s banking market. Borrowers had no choice in 
the matter of selecting an institution for financing their projects. DFIs were the principal source 
of medium and long term finance for industries while commercial banks focused mostly on 
working capital finance. 
However, it is fair to say that in conformity with the basic principles of their establishment, 
DFIs had an irreplaceable role in the industrialization process in India. Without  DFIs the closing 
of the development gap with advanced economies would have been a more protracted process. 
The composition of disbursements shows certain peculiarities. DFIs  provided financing for 
small-scale industrial sector, agriculture, rural industrialization, village industries, power and 
railway sectors, or refinanced house loans. Infrastructure received less than 16% of total dis-
bursements. Given the close linkage between industrial development and infrastructure, this 
figure is surprisingly low. An insufficient infrastructure is an obvious constraint to industrial and 
economic growth in general. Private capital may be reluctant to finance infrastructure projects 
because of their large funding need and long payback time. The data suggest that DFIs, contrary 
to their mandate, did not address the infrastructural obsoleteness of the Indian economy ad-
equately, either.4.  
3 The three most important national institutions are the Industrial  Finance Corporation of India (IFCI ) 
set up in 1948,  the  ICICI (Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (1955)  and the IDBI 
(Industrial Development Bank of India) (1964).
4 As a belated response to this,  newly created institutions were dedicated to infrastructure. The Infrastruc-
ture Development Finance Company (IDFC) was incorporated in 1997 as a private company to foster the 
growth of private capital flows for infrastructure financing. The India Infrastructure Financing Company 
Limited (IIFCL) was incorporated in 2006, as a wholly-owned government company, to provide long-term 
finance for viable infrastructure projects.
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Table 1 Composition of Disbursements by Development Finance Institutions in India: 1980–81 to 2002–03
Source: Nayyar (2017) p.208
The spectacular growth of DFI lending from the mid-60s to the end of 90s was supported 
by high demand and abundant supply. Demand was constituted by companies with reasonable 
projects, but no access to market based financing . The credit supply was little limited by fund-
ing constraints.  Numerous channels of funding were available to DFIs. However,  concessional 
government and central bank sources, namely the Long-Term Operations (LTO) Fund of the 
Reserve Bank and tax-free government guaranteed bonds constituted the most important funds 
for  DFIs. The bonds they issued were taken into account for Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) 
computation purposes for commercial banks, who therefore showed interest to subscribe to 
these bonds. 
DFIs had access to cheap funding from international institutions, too. Specific regulatory 
advantages also supported the supply side. DFIs were exempt from Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
rules. Commercial banks typically raised funding via short-term deposits, and faced high statu-
tory liquidity requirements. Consequently, it was quite unviable from a pricing perspective for 
commercial banks to compete with DFIs and do large-scale long-term financing. The low cost of 
capital for DFIs allowed them to lend at rates that were lower than market rates and use longer 
grace periods. This further increased borrowers’ appetite for their credit.
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The DFI funding came :  
•	 directly	from	the	government	in	the	form	of	subsidized	or	interest-free	loans,	
•	 	indirectly	from	the	government	through	Reserve	Bank	of	India	(RBI)	allocation	on	con-
cessional  terms. RBI allocations stemmed from its profits before they were transferred to 
the government5
•	 Government	 guaranteed	 bonds	 subscribed	 by	 commercial	 banks.	Their	 yields	 stayed	
below the usual markets rates due to the government guarantee and also because these 
bonds could be used to meet the statutory-liquidity-ratio requirements of commercial 
banks. 
•	 off-budget	transactions	that	relied	upon	public	deposits	in	state-owned	banks,	post	offices	
and pension funds. 
•	 foreign	loans	from	multilateral	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	regional	de-
velopment banks.  
•	 open	market		sources
Low cost government funding not only stimulated the business activity of DFIs but resulted 
in a dependency. DFIs were subject to political interference. “The government being an impor-
tant source of finance, it was to be expected that it would exert control over the functioning of 
these institutions and in determining the leadership of these organizations. This did imply that 
some political and partisan considerations affected the functioning of the DFIs. It also implied 
that these institutions were partly protected from close scrutiny by members of parliament and 
other representatives of the people.” (Chandrashekar (2015) p9.) Political pressure could force 
managers into loss making credit decisions against their own will. DFIs operated as wings of 
government rather than as autonomous institutions. At the same time, political protection made 
irresponsible business behavior possible , too. Acts of mismanagement were rarely followed by 
sanctions. Should any loss be incurred, the political connections were available to provide rescue 
to the company and its managers. The anticipation of a government rescue increases the moral 
hazard of economically nonviable decisions. As a result, non performing assets built up and 
profitability of DFIs suffered.6 This is what Kornai calls soft budget constraint.7 Sengupta and 
Vardhan concluded that loan quality was worse at the term-lending DFIs. (Sengupta and Vard-
han, 2017) In the absence of overall data for the DFI sector we can illustrate this by the case of 
IDBI bank, where the percentage of Gross NPAs between 1999 and 2003 ranged from 14.07% 
to 16.86% of total advances. (Chakrabarty, 2013). The entire banking sector had an approx. 10% 
NPA rate for the period of 2001-2003. “The share of non performing assets in loans as at end-
5 In reality, these are government sources as well, as profits of RBI should be part of government revenues. 
RBI  financing means that parliamentary scrutiny over these funds is not implemented.
6 In order to maintain the continuous operation of DFIs, when NPAs reached dangerous levels the go-
vernment took over part of the  infected loans. A framework for these interventions were first proposed 
by the Narasimham report of 1991: “...the Committee proposes the establishment if necessary by special 
legislation, of an Assets Reconstruction Fund (ARF) which could take  over from the banks and financial 
institutions  a  portion of the bad and doubtful debts at a discount….”  (Narasimham (1991) p.XIII
7 Kornai (1980)
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March 2002 was at 24.1 per cent in case of India Investment Bank of India (IIBI), 22.5 per cent 
in case of Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), and 13.4 per cent in case of Industrial 
Development Bank of India (IDBI). (RBI (2003)  (p.33)) For the same period, the ratio of gross 
NPAs to gross advances (of commercial banks)  declined to 10.4 per cent from 11.4 per cent in 
2000-01. (p.32) (RBI(2003)) 
The DFIs in conformity with their mandate were serving higher risk customers, as well. Con-
sequently, it was to be expected that they would have lower profits and higher NPA rates than 
market institutions.8 However, the values cited above are signs of an  unsustainable business 
model. 
IV. The fall of development finance in India
India faced an economic crisis in 1990-91, which was manifested in an unmanageable bal-
ance of payments, high rate of inflation, unsustainably high fiscal deficit, melting foreign ex-
change reserves and growing profitability and portfolio quality concerns in the banking sector. 
Under the pressure of economic malfunctioning, the government of India launched massive 
macro-economic management reforms (with the primary objective of  reducing the fiscal def-
icit); and structural and sector-specific reforms. The financial sector was a key area of these 
reform initiatives. The government established a committee under former RBI Governor M. 
Narasimham to provide an in-depth overview of the financial system. A few years later a second 
Narasimham committee was established. The reports of these committees had comprehensive 
recommendations for financial sector reforms including the banking sector and capital markets. 
The basic assumptions of this committee were that equity and bond markets as well as the bank-
ing sector made sufficient progress to better answer the external financing needs of the private 
sector. Commercial banks gradually improved their project appraisal skills, their risk manage-
ment capabilities and developed interest in long term lending. Investment commitments to in-
frastructure projects with private participation increased significantly in the 1990s, from around 
US$20 billion at the start of the decade to more than US$140 billion by 1997. (Spratt-Collins, 
2012) A higher retail deposit base aided a better asset-liability match. In addition, the develop-
ment of the bond markets enabled commercial banks to raise long term funds. Due to these 
changes the DFIs lost some of their competitive edge in the long term finance market. At the 
same time, their non-performing assets reached dangerous levels and their profitability declined. 
In accordance with the findings of the Narasimham committee, the government launched far 
reaching liberalization reform(s) in the banking sector which affected the basic function and the 
institutional setup of DFIs. The advocates of the reforms were of the view that the problems of 
DFIs were attributable to a large extent to the absence of a competitive environment for project 
lending. The modifications aimed largely at enhancing the efficiency and productivity of the 
banking system through competition. It was felt that less barriers to entry and less constraining 
8 However, “this decline in profitability is not so much because of acceptance of social obligations  of lend-
ing to some sectors at concessional rates of interest but because of deterioration in the asset quality.” (Na-
rasimham (1991) p. 101 On the other hand, the deterioration of asset quality is a consequence of  the 
acceptance of social obligations.
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regulation would enhance competition. More freedom for commercial banks and less artificial 
competitive advantage for DFIs were supposed to ensure adequate long term lending by com-
mercial banks. It is not an objective of this paper to provide a comprehensive  assessment of the 
financial reform. We will focus only on specific  aspects which had direct or indirect  links with 
development finance institutions. 
The major recommendations of the Narasimham committees with a special focus on DFIs 
are as follows:
- Capital and financial market liberalization -  
o development of new hedging tools (like Interest Rate Swaps, etc) for asset-liability mis-
matches opening the way for long term financing by commercial banks.
o permission of issue of fresh capital to the public through the capital market. Subscribers 
to such issues includes actors of private sector, public sector undertakings, general public
o No bar to new banks to enter the private sector.9 More permissive policy allowing foreign 
banks to open branches and joint ventures in India. 
o Gradual opening of the capital market to foreign portfolio  investment
- Interest rate deregulation -  
o Regulation and control of interest rates by authorities is proposed to be replaced by in-
terest rates determined by market forces. Concessional interest rates are proposed to be 
phased out. 
- Banking autonomy, policy and regulation -  
o The over-regulated and over-administered banks including DFIs should be given opera-
tional flexibility and functional autonomy especially in matters of   lending and  internal 
administration. A healthy competition between banks and DFIs is desirable. There should 
not be  any difference in the treatment between the public sector and the private sector 
banks. “The Committee also believes that commercial banks should be encouraged to pro-
vide term finance to industry, while at the same time, the_ DFls should increasingly engage 
in providing core working capital.” (Narasimham (1991) (pXXV) The DFIs should obtain 
their resources from the market on competitive terms and their privileged access to conces-
sional finance through the SLR and other arrangements should be phased out. 10 This would 
lead to an actual increase in the cost of funds for DFIs. 
o A substantial decrease in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and the statutory liquidity ratio 
(SLR) was proposed which would reduce the cost of funding for commercial banks. 11 Con-
sequently, the pricing advantage on the cost of funds would be reversed, with commercial 
banks gaining a large advantage over DFIs. Lower levels of CRR and SLR free up funds 
enabling commercial banks to provide both long term and short term industry lending
9 The entry of private sector banks was not allowed until January 1993,
10 DFIs enjoyed exemption from CRR and SLR regulation.
11 Taken SLR and CRR together, banks needed to maintain 53,5% of their resources idle with the RBI. It 
was one of the reasons for their poor profitability. High SLR and CRR meant locking of bank resources for 
government use. DFIs exemption from CRR and SLR regulation ensured a competitive advantage vis-á-vis 
commercial banks. The removal of this exemption eliminated this advantage.
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- Non performing assets - An Assets Reconstruction 'Fund (ARF)' was established to take 
over bad and doubtful debts. This process was regarded as an emergency measure and not as 
a continuing source of relief to the banks and DFIs. “lt should be made clear to the banks and 
financial	institutions	that		once	their	books	are	cleaned	up	through	this	process•	they	should	
take	 normal	 care•	 and	 pay	 due	 commercial	 attention	 in	 loan	 appraisals	 and	 supervision	
and make adequate provisions for assets of doubtful realisable value.“ (Narasimham(1991) 
(p.XIV).12
- Development banks were to be turned into commercial banks and as such they had to 
satisfy the prudential norms applicable to the banks.13 An RBI study argued in 2004 that 
the  role of DFIs could be performed just as well by commercial banks and capital markets, 
therefore  national term-lending institutions should be converted into banks or non-banking 
financial companies. (RBI, 2004)  
The immediate consequence of the financial reforms on DFIs was their extreme marginaliza-
tion in the development finance arena. This was caused by three factors:
- a sudden shrinkage of business activity of DFIs due to the sharp increase in their cost of 
funding
- a reformulation of their business policy
- a reduction in the number of DFIs
The most important single reform measure was halting the concessional funding of DFIs. 
Government guaranteed bonds were gradually phased out and access to the low cost funds of 
the Reserve Bank was also discontinued. DFIs could raise resources by way of raising debt and 
equity in the domestic and international  capital market. As a result, their marginal cost of funds 
increased sharply. The old business model of development finance institutions was not sustain-
able without financial support from the government. Once funding was raised from the markets, 
DFIs had to operate according to market logic. The more expensive market funding made the 
use of under-the-market lending rates no longer possible and  allowed substantially less lending. 
Their risk taking pattern had to be similar to that of any other commercial bank, i.e. higher risk 
customers could not count on credit decisions deviating from pure market considerations any 
more. As for the total disbursements of DFIs, the spectacular growth of the 1990s was followed 
by a sharp decline during the first half of the 2000s. This process is the most striking when their 
share in total bank credit, industry lending and gross fixed capital formation are considered. 
The  total disbursements of DFIs as a percentage of industry lending plunged dramatically from 
the peak level of 30% to below 5% by the early 2000s. In gross fixed capital formation and bank 
credit, the share of DFI dropped from 15-17% to 3-5%.  
 
12 Warnings have not proved to be sufficient. The RBI was forced to introduce a strategic debt restructuring 
(SDR) scheme in June 2015, which was a new version of the corporate debt restructuring (CDR) scheme 
of August 2001.
13 This transformation started with the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) in 
2002 and continued with the Industrial Bank of India (IDBI) in 2004.
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Fig. 1  Evolution of relative weight of DFIs over time
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2017 
The biggest drop in the share of DFIs took place in industry lending (-25%points), while the share of 
industry in total bank lending contracted significantly and was on a declining path since the early 70s. 
This suggests that neither DFIs nor banks provided sufficient support to industrial expansion in India. 
The downsizing is another factor explaining the marginalization process of DFIs. According to 
the advocates of the financial reform, commercial banks were able and interested in providing term 
lending, therefore there was no need to maintain the same number of DFIs. Following the reform 
recommendations, the government shut down several development finance institutions.  14Those who 
remained reformulated their business policy. Their development financing activity faded away, but 
they made significant penetration into retail banking, and in particular to the personal loan market. 
Comprehensive data are not available, however, individual cases are in full consistency with the above 
statement. The evolution and the composition of the ICICI Bank’s gross advances  clearly indicates 
both the headway of retail banking and a decline of classical development finance activity. While con-
sumer loans represent half of total advances, infrastructure lending has a mere 11% share. ISBI Bank 
shows similar business characteristics. In its loan book, the share of retail advances increased to 43 per 
cent in March 2017 from 33 per cent at the end of March 2016. The announced strategy of IDBI Bank 
is to improve the share of retail business to 50% of book size over the next 3 years. 
Fig. 2 ICICI Loan Portfolio, 2002
Source: ICICI Annual Reports
Fig. 3 ICICI Loan Portfolio, March 2017
Source: ICICI Annual Reports
14 Two national  DFIs (IFCI and IRBI) withered away. On state level, SFCs (State Financial Corporation)  and 
SIDCs (State Industrial Development Corporation) Industrial Investment Bank of India were closed down.
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Fig. 4 Composition of ICICI advances, March 2017
 
Source: ICICI Annual Reports                
Following the negative impacts of  the financial reform, the  DFIs did not disappear from 
view, but reemerged in a transformed suit. Their post-reform business priorities ensured eco-
nomic survival but they were inconsistent with their original mandate. The new  retail banking 
focus not only compensated for the drying up of project lending but helped to reach the earlier 
peak of disbursements. 
Fig. 5 Disbursementsof DFIs, 1971-2017
Source: Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation India Time Series
The transformation of DFIs does not allow to conclude that development finance activity as 
such collapsed. The question is whether other actors could step in as good substitutes of DFIs 
in the development finance business. The available evidence is not convincing. Because of its 
capital intensive nature and the long payback period infrastructure is typical development fi-
nancing target area. Based on the weakening and the transformation of DFIs one could expect a 
setback in infrastructure financing. This has not happened. While the long term lending of DFIs 
plummeted, the share of infrastructure in bank lending increased substantially. This suggests 
that commercial banks successfully stepped in and compensated for the withdrawal of DFIs. As 
industry lending grew slower than total bank lending, the share of infrastructure shows a more 
rapid improvement when compared to industry lending.  
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Fig. 6 Relative importance of infrastructure lending, 1998-2016
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2017 
There are other indicators consistent with this. Prior to the financial reform, DFI disburse-
ments amounted to 50% of gross fix capital formation. However, their plummeting in the early 
2000s did not cause a break in the evolution of GFCF. A comparison of the average GFCF growth 
rates of the five years prior to (18.2%) and following (9.2%) the implementation of the financial 
reform, shows no break.15 The same holds for the 10 year comparison. Alternative sources of 
financing made an unbroken progress of capital formation possible. Commercial bank lending 
is one of these. Total bank lending visibly accelerated after the introduction of the financial re-
forms. Neither the GDP growth nor the inflation performance explain these developments. Both 
of them had slower growth in the post-reform years. The rapid growth of bank credit was mainly 
the result of commercial banks effort to fill the void left by DFIs 
Table 2 Evolution of selected financial and macro variables      average annual growth  rate
Before financial reform* After financial reform
Preceding 5 years Preceding 10 
years
Following 5 years Following 10 
years
GFCF at current 
prices
11,0% 13,7% 18,2% 17,4%
Bank credit 15,1% 16,1% 24,4% 22,8%
GDP at market 
prices
12,2% 14,1% 11,2% 13,6%
CPI-IW 6,8% 4,1%
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2017
15 The financial reforms consisted of  various measures introduced at different points in time .  Year 2002 
is taken here as the dividing line of the pre and post reform period, as the most striking changes in the 
position of DFIs started that year.
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Some other information contradicts the successful  transition of development finance from 
DFIs to commercial banks and capital market institutions. According to Kumar (2015), banks 
were not able to meet the demand of industry for finance. The rapid growth in bank lending was 
accompanied by a declining share of industry lending. Undoubtedly, a rapid industrial catch-up 
is unlikely if industry is getting a smaller and smaller portion of bank credit.16
Fig. 7 Composition of bank lending, 1972-2016
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2017 
The inner structure of industry lending reveals additional weaknesses. The post-reform fi-
nancing proved to be beneficial to urban districts and contributed to a further exclusion of rural 
areas. Banks closed their loss making rural branches and the tighter branch network caused a 
decline in the share of rural credit from 15% (1990) to 9% (2014). (Kumar (2015  Kumar (2015) 
pointed out, the share of long-term deposits in the total bank deposits declined sharply, posing 
severe limits on long-term lending. The domestic securities market was able to provide only 
constrained resources to commercial banks. The Indian primary bond market showed an ap-
praisable growth only from 2004 but its size was still only about one third of that of Brazil or 10% 
of that of China in the middle of 2010s. Therefore the Indian bond market does not represent 
an alternative source of funding either for banks or for the corporate sector. There were three 
peaks (2006, 2012, 2014) in the last decade, when banks' issuances captured a higher share of 
the primary market. However, the amounts obtained were negligible  (0,5-1,5%) compared to 
16 This erosion did not start with the introduction of fiancial reforms. The share of industry in bank lending 
dropped from 61% to 48% between 1972 and 1992, which were the flourishing years of DFIs. Consequently, 
even then,  the DFIs were unable to compensate for the insufficient interest of commercial banks in in-
dustry lending . In the later years,  the financial reform did not entail any change in this respect.
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their deposits of the given year. Chandrasekhar points out that „ between 2003-04 and 2006-07, 
which was a period when FII inflows rose significantly and stock markets were buoyant most 
of the time, equity capital mobilized by the Indian corporate sector rose from Rs.676.2 billion 
to Rs.1.77 trillion.” (Chandrasekhar (2015) (p.10) This latter figure represents 16% of total bank 
credit.
Fig. 8  Resources Mobilised from the Primary Market 
Source: SEBI Handbook of Statistics on Indian Securities Market, 2017
As for external sources, commercial borrowing is the most common way for Indian compa-
nies  to raise money outside the country. This instrument after long years of sleep state embarked 
upon a rapid but short lived growth path beginning in 2004. First, the global financial crisis, 
after that the weak growth performance of the Indian economy caused a decline in commercial 
borrowing, All in all external commercial borrowing proved to be an insignificant source of 
corporate financing. Even at its peak, commercial borrowing represented a mere 3.5% of total 
bank deposits. 
Fig. 9  Evolution of commercial borrowings, net, Billion 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI,  2017
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V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
The financial reforms deprived DFIs of their regulatory advantages and of their access to 
concessional funding. As a result, they became unable to meet the demand of the corporate sec-
tor for long term financing, thereby their original role remained unfulfilled and their very raison 
d'être could be called in question. In order to survive, they developed a new business profile 
focusing  on retail banking. With the closure and transformation of DFIs  and in the absence 
of a deep and liquid corporate bond market, long term financing had to be carried out by com-
mercial banks. Banks made significant progress to meet industry demands for finance, but they 
failed to become good substitutes for DFIs. The rapid  exit of DFIs from project finance at the 
beginning of the 2000s did not produce a break in capital formation or infrastructure spending. 
Banks' exposure to infrastructure has grown rapidly. However, the declining share of industry 
in total bank lending is an indicator of constraints to rapid industrialization. A greater boost to 
industry lending was not compatible with the banks’ profit goals. Some of the constraints are of 
general nature and not specific to Indian market developments. The asset –liability mismatch 
preventing long term lending is a feature of the banking business in general. Banks (and corpo-
rations) in advanced economies rely on the bond and equity markets and external borrowing to 
mitigate the negative impact of the mismatch. However, the  underdevelopment of the Indian 
bond and equity market, the growing share of bank deposits (mainly short term) and claims on 
government in household savings and the irresolute movements of external commercial borrow-
ings  do not promise a quick improvement of the mismatch.  
The catch-up with industrialization does not depend on long term finance only. New proj-
ects without access to finances will not materialize. At this point, the information asymmetry 
argument has to be reemphasized.  Banks physically distanced from the lieu of prospective un-
dertakings will likely have limited information on the prospects of new firms in rural areas  and 
will likely reject many promising  plans because of this. Indian commercial banks, too, amass 
a wealth of information on their clients, improved their project appraisal skills and their risk 
management capabilities but the unevenness of information and the resulting underprovision of 
credit continues to exist. As the establishment of new bank branches is guided by prospects of 
profitability, there will remain unserved (mostly rural) areas, where access to finance will be lim-
ited. The government is also unable to eliminate the information asymmetry. The government 
does not have any more information on the profit prospects of projects than the banks. Nor does 
it have any monopolistic additional knowledge in assessing their viability. There will, however, be 
projects that hold out less on profits but that verifiably increase social welfare and so can expect 
funding from state development institutions. 
This paper concludes that it was a strategic mistake to enforce the transformation of develop-
ment finance institutions into commercial banks and rely solely on market forces for long term 
industrial lending.17 Markets are not sufficient to deliver the highest possible social welfare in most 
advanced economies. They are less so in less advanced economies. Consequently, this paper joins 
those who recommend the reestablishment of special financing institutions promoting long term 
17 Similar wiews are expressed by Nayyar (2017), Kumar (2015), Ray(2015)
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industrial lending. It seems that central bankers of India are nuanced advocates of this approach. 
The Reserve Bank of India released a Discussion Paper on ‘Wholesale & Long-Term Finance Banks’ 
in April 2017. Former central bank governors Y.V.Reddy18 and C. Rangarajan  19expressed their open 
support for the proposal. The key arguments for and features of such institutions are the following20:
- The proposed new bank(s) will lend to companies which would not get a loan from commer-
cial banks because of the high risk and the long payback period of their project. Infrastruc-
ture projects  are typically of this kind. High risk is associated with more defaults, therefore it 
is likely that these banks would be vulnerable to loan portfolio and lower profitability issues. 
However, the mission undertaken must not be an excuse for every portfolio problem. It is 
the responsibility of the independent management to take on risks only which do not result 
in a dangerous increase of NPAs and do not put the stability of the bank in jeopardy. High 
level of transparency and public accountability might be helpful to separate the impact of 
company objectives and that of (mistaken) management decisions, horribile dictu, external 
political influence on asset quality. Lending decisions affect territorial, industry, etc. groups 
differently, and it can be predicted that winners and losers (mostly losers) will express their 
concerns. The new banks will be subject to public scrutiny and heated political discussions. 
- Low cost resources are necessary conditions for competitiveness and for long term lending 
at reasonable rates. Low capital costs prevent higher client risk taken in conformity with the 
business policy of the new banks being reflected in higher lending rates  While resources 
should mostly originate from debt issuances in local and external markets in the form of 
bonds and asset securitization, special regulatory measures should ensure the marketability 
of those securities at a low yield level. Relaxations in respect of CRR, SLR, compliance with 
liquidity ratios, government guarantee for bond issuance are often mentioned as examples 
(see Reddy (2018),  RBI (2017) Direct budget transfers and central bank funding may put 
too much pressure on government finances and represent a vehicle for political interferen-
ce. Therefore they need to be kept at a low level or fully avoided. Central bank profits are 
due to the budget, therefore their direct transfer to a particular economic actor prevents the 
public from deciding on the utilization of public resources. Therefore the earlier practice of 
transfer of central bank resources to DFIs is not to be reexercised. Access to low cost resour-
ces of multilateral and bilateral agencies should be permitted. 
- Independent decision-making, the absence of political interference is a precondition of so-
und management. Words of the first Narashimam report of 1991 apply unchanged today, 
too. “We believe that ensuring the integrity and autonomy of operations of banks and DFIs 
is by far the more relevant issue at present than the question of their ownership.” (p.6) Auto-
nomy can be ensured both in private and public ownership structure of these banks. In the 
latter case, the personal independence of the top manager is crucial. Appointment and di-
smissal procedures, income rules should be set in such a way as to ensure the independence 
of top managers. Mixed ownership is feasible only if several conditions are met simultane-
ously. Private capital takes ownership only if it has been ascertained that its profit expectati-
18 Y.V.Reddy: Development Banking – Way Forward -  NSE-IEA Lecture on Financial Economics at Indian 
Economic Association 100th Annual Conference 2nd January, 2018
19 C Rangarajan - S Sridhar: We need a bank just for long-term credit in The Hindu Business Line April 09, 2017
20 These are similar to the points made when DFIs were established at the first place 
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ons will be met, i.e. its co-owner will not drive the bank to money loosing activities. On the 
other hand, the state will accept private capital as co-owner if it has been ascertained that 
their joint venture will pursue social objectives as well. Formal agreements or operational 
rules  cannot, however, of themselves alone ensure the continuous implementation of these 
expectations. Therefore mixed ownership is a fragile structure.  
At the time of the writing of this article it has not yet been determined whether develop-
ment finance institutions will resurrect in India or not. This depends on the role the political 
decision-makers envisage for market and non-market forces in the socio-economic catch-up of 
the country. If the forces believing that market-based catching up would take longer than pos-
sible as a result of the inadequate operation of the capital markets gain ground, we may expect 
the reappearance of financial institutions similar to DFIs in India. 
References 
Chandrasekhar, C. P .: Development Finance in India in Development Finance in the BRICS 
Countries Published by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, New Delhi, 2015
Esteva M. – Freixas X.: Public Development Banks Who to Target and How? in Finance and 
Invesdtement: The European Case eds. Mayer ÍC.-Micossi S. Onado M-Pagano M. – Polo 
A. Oxford University Press, 2018 
Greenwald B. – Levinson A. – Stiglitz J. : Capital Market Imperfections and regional economic 
development  in Finance and Development:  Issues and Experience  ed. By Alberto Giovan-
ni CEPR, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 65-93. 
Kornai J. : Economics of Shortage Vol. A-B Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980
Kumar S.D.: Industrial Finance  in the Era of Financial Liberalisation in India:  Exploring Some 
Structural Issues Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, 2015 
Narasimham Report  of the Committee on the Financial System, 1991
Nayyar D.: Development Banks and Industrial Finance: the Indian Experience and its Lessons", 
in Akbar Noman and Joseph Stiglitz eds. Efficiency, Finance and Varieties of Industrial 
Policy, Columbia University Press, New York, 2017.
Rangarajan C –  Sridhar S.  : We need a bank just for long-term credit in The Hindu Business 
Line April 09, 2017
Ray P.: Rise and Fall of Industrial Finance in India Economic & Political Weekly January 31, 2015 vol l no 5
Reddy Y.V. : Development Banking – Way Forward -  NSE-IEA Lecture on Financial Economics 
at  Indian Economic Association 100th Annual Conference 2nd January, 2018
Reserve Bank of India (2003) REPORT ON CURRENCY AND FINANCE 2001-02 
Reserve Bank of India (2004): Report of the Working Group on Development Financial Institu-
tions, Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India
Reserve Bank of India (2017), Discussion Paper on 'Wholesale & Long-Term Finance Banks'. 
Seidman, Karl: Economic Development Finance, Sage, 2005
Spratt S. - Collins L.R. :  Development Finance Institutions and Infrastructure: A Systematic Review 
of Evidence for Development Additionality  Private Infrastructure Development Group, 2012
Stiglitz J (1989): “Financial Markets and Development,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 5(4), 
1989, pp. 55-68.
